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1. Introduction
The analysis of the Simonshaven case developed in this paper uses a theoretical per-
spective on evidential reasoning “with and without probabilities.” Instead of choosing
between one of the three primary analytic tools discussed in the literature, namely argu-
ments, scenarios, and probabilities (Anderson et al., 2005; Dawid et al., 2011; Di Bello &
Verheij, 2018; Kaptein et al., 2009), the theoretical perspective used in this paper has
been designed to connect arguments, scenarios, and probabilities in one approach, in an
attempt to bridge qualitative and quantitative analytic styles (Fig. 1) (Verheij, 2014,
2017).
In this way, an attempt is made to use a single framework to study themes that are
investigated separately in each of the approaches. For instance, in argumentative
approaches—for criminal law going back to Wigmore (1913)—argument structure, defeat,
and evaluation are studied (Bex et al., 2003; van Eemeren et al., 2014; Gordon & Walton,
2009; Prakken & Sartor, 2009; Walton, 2002). In scenario approaches—influential in
legal psychology (Bennett & Feldman, 1981; Crombag et al., 1992; Keppens & Schafer,
2006; van Koppen, 2012; Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Wagenaar et al., 1993)—sets of
events are considered as coherent wholes and analyzed in connection with the evidence.
In probabilistic analyses—going back to early forensic science (Taroni et al., 1998)—it is
made explicit how hypothethical events are probabilistically connected to the evidence.
Combined approaches are being studied, for instance, inference to the best scenario
(Allen & Pardo, 2007), scenarios and arguments (Bex, 2011; Bex et al., 2010), evidential
Bayesian networks (Fenton et al., 2013; Hepler et al., 2007; Keppens, 2012), and scenar-
ios and probabilities (Di Bello, 2013; Urbaniak, 2018). See Di Bello and Verheij (2018)
for further detail about the three approaches and their connections.
Formally, the theoretical perspective in this paper uses case models (Verheij, 2017),
formalizing the modeling style of evidential reasoning developed in (Verheij, 2014). A
case model consists of cases that are expressed by logical sentences of what can be the
case, ordered by a preference ordering.
For analyzing evidential reasoning, each case in a case model can be thought of as
representing a possible combination of evidence and a hypothetical cluster of events,
such as a scenario. The preference ordering represents which cases are equivalent or
preferred over other cases. Here, the ordering can be interpreted in different ways,
depending on the use of the formalism. For instance, in an argumentation perspective,
Fig. 1. Arguments, scenarios, and probabilities.
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the ordering can be used to model the validity, defeat, and (relative) strength of argu-
ments. In a scenario perspective, the ordering can be used to model quality properties
of scenarios, like consistency, plausibility, and completeness. In a probabilistic per-
spective, the ordering can be used to model relative probability, positive probability,
and probability above a threshold.
The ordering on cases in a case model is formally a total preorder; hence, it provides
the kind of ordering that can be represented by a numeric representation. Therefore, in a
formally precise sense, the ordering on cases is simultaneously with and without numbers:
It is with numbers since the ordering can be derived from a numeric representation; it is
without numbers since an ordering is a qualitative relation. In the context of evidential
reasoning, a numeric representation of the ordering can be taken to be a probability
function.
The approach is inspired by findings in a Netherlands-based research project on analyz-
ing evidential reasoning using Bayesian networks.1 In the project, methods have been
developed for the design and understanding of Bayesian networks using scenarios (Vlek,
2016; Vlek et al., 2016) and using arguments (Timmer, 2017; Timmer et al., 2017). The
methods developed build on earlier work on the use of Bayesian network modeling for
evidential reasoning (Fenton et al., 2013; Hepler et al., 2007).
While developing the methods in the project, well-known issues with Bayesian net-
work modeling were encountered. The first issue concerns the incompleteness of numeric
information. The issue arises since a Bayesian network model is a representation of a
complete joint probability distribution over the variables used in the model, whereas it is
not straightforward to establish or estimate all numbers that are needed. The second issue
concerns transparent interpretation. The issue arises since, although the formal meaning
of a Bayesian network model is well-defined, there is the risk of misinterpreting the
graphical structure of a Bayesian network, for instance in causal terms (Dawid, 2010).
The theoretical perspective of case models used in this paper has been designed to
address these issues. For addressing the issue of incompleteness of numeric information,
the case model approach does not require the representation of a complete joint probabil-
ity distribution over the variables. For addressing the issue of transparent interpretation,
the case model approach uses notions of formal validity to evaluate arguments and sce-
narios.
Section 22 provides background materials on the Simonshaven case and the case
model formalism. In Section 32.2.1, the analysis of the case is developed. Section 43.2
provides the full formalized case model. The paper ends with discussion and conclusion
sections.
2. Background
Section 2.12.1 provides an overview of the case, used as an illustration of the
case model formalism in connection with arguments, scenarios, and probabilities
(Section 2.22.2).
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2.1. Overview of the case
At first instance (Court of Rotterdam, November 30, 2012), during the discussion at
court, two possible hypotheses about what might have happened were considered: the
guilty-as-charged hypothesis—presented by the prosecution—that Ed Lourens killed
Jenny Lourens, and the robbery hypothesis—presented by the defence and based on Ed’s
statement—that Jenny was killed by a robber jumping from the bushes. There also is a
third, not explicitly discussed, but analytically relevant complimentary possibility that nei-
ther the guilty-as-charged scenario nor the robbery scenario is true, and that something
different has happened. At the first instance, it was decided that the guilty-as-charged sce-
nario was proven lawfully and convincingly. In other words, the other two hypothetical
possibilities were decided to be (sufficiently) excluded by the evidence.
At the second instance (Court of Appeal The Hague, February 18, 2015), the robbery
hypothesis was split into two variations of what might have happened. One version of the
robbery hypothesis is the Perry scenario, in which Perry Sultan is considered to be the
killing robber, perhaps helped by Tom Seelen. The other version is the scenario in which
there is another unknown third person who is the killing robber. The court again decided
that the guilty-as-charged scenario was proven lawfully and convincingly. The other three
hypothetical possibilities were excluded by the evidence.
In Fig. 2, the hypothetical possibilities as considered by the two courts are graphically
shown as boxes. At the top, the three options as considered by the Court of Rotterdam
are shown.
1. the guilty-as-charged hypothesis that Ed Lourens is guilty (marked guilt);
2. the robbery hypothesis that Jenny was killed by a robber (marked robbery); and
3. the complementary hypothesis that something different has happened.
At the Court of Appeal The Hague, the second option is considered in two variations:
2. a. The hypothesis that Perry was the killing robber (marked perry);
b. the hypothesis that a third person, not Ed, not Perry, was the killing robber
(marked third).
In both decisions, the guilty-as-charged scenario was considered to be proven by the
evidence, as graphically indicated at the bottom of the diagram: the guilty-as-charged
scenario is selected and the other hypotheses are excluded, as indicated by the line.
Fig. 2. Overview of the case.
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2.2. Case models and their connection to arguments, scenarios, and probabilities
Here, an informal introduction of case models is provided, as needed for the case anal-
ysis developed in this paper. Details of the case model formalism are given in Verheij
(2017). Formally case models consist of consistent mutually exclusive sentences, ordered
by a preference ordering. The four hypotheses discussed in Section 2.1 can be formalized
as cases as follows:
1. guilt
2. a. ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ perry
b. ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ ¬perry ∧ third
3. ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery
Here, ¬ represents logical negation and ∧ logical conjunction, so option 2a means “Ed
Lourens is not guilty as charged and Jenny was killed in a robbery and Perry is the rob-
ber.” Option 3 means “Ed Lourens is not guilty as charged and Jenny was not killed in a
robbery,” representing the situation that the case of Jenny’s murder is not solved as in
the guilty-as-charged and robbery hypotheses. Note that guilt represents Ed’s guilt as
charged by the prosecution, and not his guilt of killing Jenny in other ways. Another, as
yet unknown, way in which Ed would be guilty of killing Jenny would fall under the
third hypothesis.
These cases do not yet represent the evidence, which for now, we will logically sum-
marize as all-evidence, representing the totality of the evidence. In the full analysis
below (Section 3), details of the actual evidence are modeled in a more specific case
model.
Following the court decisions, only option 1 is compatible with the totality of the evi-
dence, and the other options are not compatible with all the evidence. Formally we can
model this by adapting the formulas above. For case 1, we add ∧ all-evidence, for
the others ∧ ¬all-evidence:
1. guilt ∧ all-evidence
2. a. ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ perry ∧ ¬all-evidence
b. ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ ¬perry ∧ third ∧ ¬all-evidence
3. ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery ∧ ¬all-evidence
These four cases can be thought of as representing a brief summary of the hypotheses
and the evidence considered by the Court of Appeal in The Hague. According to this
summary, options 1, 2a, 2b, and 3 are the four possibilities considered in the case pro-
ceedings. Of these, only the first is compatible with all the evidence, so given all the evi-
dence, the guilty-as-charged hypothesis is legally proven and the other options are legally
excluded. Graphically, this is shown in Fig. 2 by the bottom line showing the decision
where of the four boxes only the one representing the guilty-as-charged hypothesis has
remained, and the others have been excluded (suggested by the line).
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Case models also contain a preference ordering, formally a total preorder, that is,
reflexive and transitive. For instance, let us assume that the cases above can be ordered
as follows:
1 > 2a ~ 2b > 3
Diagrams can be used as graphical illustration of case models. The formal case model
discussed here corresponds to the four boxes modeling the hypotheses considered by the
Court of Appeal in Fig. 2. The ordering of the four cases is reflected in the relative sizes
of the boxes: Option 1, the guilty-as-charged hypothesis, is ordered higher than the two
robbery hypotheses 2a and 2b, which are ordered equally, and in turn are ordered higher
than option 3 that something different has happened. The absolute sizes of the boxes have
no counterpart in the formal case model.
In evidential reasoning with arguments, scenarios, and probabilities, cases and their
ordering can be interpreted in different ways, as follows. Formal details of the terminol-
ogy used are given in Verheij (2017).
2.2.1. Arguments
Arguments from premises to conclusions can be formally evaluated given a case model
using three kinds of formal argument validity: coherence, presumptive validity, and con-
clusiveness.
An argument from premises to conclusions is coherent when there is a case in which
both the premises and the conclusions hold. In a sense, coherence models which conclu-
sions are possible given the premises. For instance, in the case model above the argument
from the evidence to the guilty-as-charged hypothesis is coherent, since in Case 1 both
all-evidence and guilt obtain. The argument from the evidence to the Perry
hypothesis is not coherent since there is no case in which both all-evidence and
perry obtain.
A coherent argument is presumptively valid when the argument’s conclusions obtain in
a maximally ordered case in which the premises obtain. One could say that presumptive
validity models default conclusions given the premises. Such default conclusions can be
defeated given further information. For instance, the argument from empty premises
(which obtain in all cases and are logically formalized as a tautology) to the guilty-as-
charged hypothesis is presumptively valid, since Case 1 is maximal in the ordering. The
argument from empty premises to the Perry hypothesis is not presumptively valid, since
Case 2a is not maximal in the ordering.
A coherent argument is conclusive if the argument’s conclusions obtain in all cases in
which the premises obtain. Conclusive arguments model a kind of certain reasoning. For
instance, the argument from the evidence to the guilty-as-charged hypothesis is conclu-
sive since the only case in which all-evidence obtains is Case 1 and in that case
also guilt obtains. Case models can model argument defeat. For instance, the presump-
tively valid argument from the empty premises to the guilty-as-charged hypothesis has
¬all-evidence as defeating circumstances, since the argument is no longer presump-
tively valid after adding ¬all-evidence to the argument’s premises. Since the
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argument from ¬all-evidence to ¬guilt, the negation of the defeated argument’s
conclusion, is presumptively valid, the defeating circumstances are rebutting, in the termi-
nology proposed by Pollock (1987).
2.2.2. Scenarios
Scenarios represented by structured logical sentences can be evaluated using case mod-
els. Three kinds of evaluation are distinguished, following the kinds of logical validity
discussed above.
A scenario is coherent when there is a case in the case model that logically implies
the scenario. So the robbery scenario in which Perry is the robber killing Jenny, repre-
sented by the logical sentence robbery ∧ perry, is coherent since Case 2a logically
implies the sentence.
A coherent scenario is plausible when it is implied by a presumptively valid case (i.e.,
it is a case that is maximal in the ordering). So the guilty-as-charged scenario, here repre-
sented simply as guilt, is plausible since it is implied by Case 1 that is maximal in the
ordering.
A coherent scenario is beyond a reasonable doubt when it is implied by all cases.
Here, there is no scenario beyond a reasonable doubt.
The three kinds of evaluating scenarios can be applied relative to given evidence. For
instance, a scenario is coherent given the evidence, when there is a case that implies the
scenario and that also implies the evidence. Here, only the guilt is coherent given all
the evidence all-evidence. A coherent scenario is plausible given the evidence when
there is a case that implies the scenario that is maximal in the ordering among the cases
that imply the evidence. Here, the guilt scenario is plausible given all the evidence
all-evidence. A coherent scenario is beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidence
when it is implied by all cases that imply the evidence. Indeed, the guilt scenario is
beyond a reasonable doubt given all-evidence.
2.2.3. Probabilities
The kinds of validity can be given a probabilistic interpretation. Formally this is possi-
ble since the ordering of a case model is a total preorder, which are the kinds of ordering
that can be represented numerically, even probabilistically. For instance, using the sizes
of the boxes for choosing the numbers, we can assign Case 1, Case 2a, Case 2b, and Case
3, probabilities 50%, 20%, 20%, and 10%, respectively. Clearly, these numbers are just
one of many possibilities that could numerically realize the ordering Case 1 > Case
2a  Case 2b > Case 3 with positive probabilities. If we would be able to provide good
probabilistic estimates of how probable each case is (which often will not be the case),
we could use those. The current choices represent that the guilty-as-charged hypothesis is
modeled as most probable, followed by the two robbery hypotheses, considered as
equally probable, in turn followed by the even less, but still positively probable “some-
thing else has happened” option.
Of the three kinds of validity, coherence corresponds to positive probability. Here all
three cases have positive probability, so they are coherent. More generally, the strength
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of an argument can be measured by the conditional probability of the conjunction of the
argument’s premises and conclusions conditioned on that of the premises. So the argu-
ment from empty premises to guilt has strength 50/100 = 50% = 0.5 and the argument
from all-evidence to guilt has strength 50/50 = 100% = 1. It can be proven that
presumptive validity can be characterized by strength above a threshold. Conclusiveness
can be characterized as strength equal to 1, as, for example, the argument from all-
evidence to guilt.
3. Analysis of the Simonshaven case using case models
In this section, the analysis of the Simonshaven case is developed as a series of ever
more specific case models, illustrated with diagrams. Section 3.1 handles the initial inves-
tigation, Section 3.2 the alternative robbery scenario (in two variations), Section 3.3, the
statement of the suspect (Section 3.3), and Section 3.4 the suspect’s wounds and his
physical capabilities. The full formalized case model of the Simonshaven case is given in
Section 4.
3.1. Initial findings
When the police arrive on the scene, they find Ed Lourens smeared with blood spatters
(suspect-with-spatters), a wound on his forehead (suspect-with-wound),
and he is heavily shaking (suspect-shaking). These findings open up an investiga-
tion into what has happened. At this early stage, the space of possibilities is modeled as
consisting of one case, expressing the conjunction of the evidence (first row in Fig. 3). In
the figure, the evidence encountered is marked on the left, and the empty box indicates
the situation to be investigated further. Then the police find the victim’s remains (second
row, remains-victim), implying that the case is now about a killing (victim-
killed). The victim’s face is bloody (victim-bloody-face), she lies in a pool of
blood (pool-of-blood) and there is a visible neck injury (neck-injury). These
cumulative evidential findings (listed on the left side of the figure) suggest that the sus-
pect may be guilty of killing the victim (guilt). But the hypothesis that he is not guilty
is also considered a possibility, indicated by the box labeled ¬guilt. The two boxes on
the third row represent two hypotheses, each a specification of the single hypothesis
shown as a box on the top two rows. In other words, the space of possibilities can now
be modeled by two cases, expressed by the conjunction of the evidence with either the
guilty-as-charged hypothesis or the not-guilty-as-charged hypothesis.
In the continued forensic investigation, cartridges are found near the victim’s head and
in the vicinity (cartridges), it is established that there is gunshot residue on the vic-
tim’s skull (gunshot-residue-victim), and there are specific, v-shaped wounds
on the victim’s face (v-shaped-wounds). These suggest that the victim was hit by a
gun (hit-by-gun).2 It then turns out that the suspect has gunshot residue on his hands
and trousers (gun-shot-residue-suspect), that he has threatened the victim
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multiple times in the past (past-threats) and that he has been violent towards the
victim in the past (past-violence). These findings indicate that the victim was hit
by the suspect (hit-by-suspect). It is found that the suspect and victim separated a
few months ago (separation) and the victim was dating other men (dating-
other-men), which provides a motive for the crime (motive).
In the early phases of the investigation, the suspect states (statement-suspect)
that the victim and he were robbed by someone suddenly jumping from the bushes
(robbery). This hypothetical scenario is shown on the final row in Fig. 3, with the
small box on the right indicating the possibility that there was no robbery as indicated by
the suspect and that something else has happened (¬robbery, abbreviated in the figure
as ¬r.). The space of possibilities now consists of three cases, one expressing the guilty-
as-charged hypothesis, one the robbery scenario, and the third anything else considered
possible.
In sum, at the end of these initial findings, a model is constructed consisting of three
hypothetical possibilities. The first is the guilty-as-charged scenario. In this scenario, the
victim is killed (victim-killed) and the suspect is guilty of killing her (guilt).
She was hit by a gun (hit-by-gun) by the suspect (hit-by-suspect), with the
relational problems as motive (motive). The second is the robbery scenario, in which
the victim was killed (victim-killed), the suspect is not guilty (¬guilt), and there
was a robbery by an unknown man, killing the victim (robbery). The third possibility
is that the victim was killed (victim-killed), the suspect is not guilty ¬guilt),
Fig. 3. The initial findings: A guilt suspect or a robbery.
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and there was also no robbery as described by the suspect (¬robbery). Formally, the
possibilities are represented as the following three conjunctions:
1. victim-killed ∧ guilt ∧ hit-by-gun ∧ hit-by-suspect ∧
motive
2. victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery
3. victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery
The collected evidence at this stage is a long conjunction as follows:
suspect-with-spatters ∧ suspect-with-wound ∧ suspect-shaking
∧ remains-victim
∧ victim-bloody-face ∧ pool-of-blood ∧ neck-injury
∧ cartridges ∧ gunshot-residue-victim ∧ v-shaped-wounds
∧ gunshot-residue-suspect ∧ past-threats ∧ past-violence
∧ separation ∧ dating-other-men
∧ statement-suspect
Formally, the case model that we have constructed until now consists of three cases,
each expressed by one of the hypotheses conjoined with all the evidence. In the model,
each of the scenarios is considered to be coherent with the evidence; hence, it is modeled
by a case in which the evidence holds. Until now, nothing has been said about their rela-
tive plausibility. If we consider the guilty-as-charged scenario to be more plausible than
the robbery scenario, and that in turn more so than the third, we have a case model in
which we have the following:
Case 1 > Case 2 > Case 3
The sizes of the boxes at the bottom row of Fig. 3 have been chosen to fit the corre-
sponding total preorder.
3.2. Alternative scenario: A robbery
After the first court’s decision, the investigation of another, independent case connects
Perry Sultan—and perhaps also Tom Seelen, who we ignore in the rest of the text—with
the surroundings of the crime scene of the Simonshaven case. In Perry Sultan’s house,
the police find a map with marks, one of them close to the place where Jenny was found
dead. Subsequently a pit is discovered there (pit-found). By these findings, the rob-
bery scenario becomes more concrete and is split into two possibilities. In the first possi-
bility, Perry Sultan is the robber jumping from the bushes and killing the victim
(perry); in the second, he is not, but someone else is the killing robber (¬perry). The
findings and options are shown in Fig. 4, second row. The first row corresponds to the
end result of the initial findings, as discussed in the previous subsection (Fig. 3).
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The possibility that Perry is the killing robber is extensively investigated by the police.
First, the pit turns out to be unsuitable for a long stay because of the high groundwater
level (no-long-stay). Perry denies involvement (denial). The DNA profiles found
on the cartridges and clothes and body of the victim do not match Perry’s (no-match-
perry). The metal pipe used in violent crimes by Perry does not fit the wounds found
on Jenny (no-fit-pipe). Perry’s phone is not linked to the location (phone-not-
linked). The description of the robber by Ed as a white man with a bulky stature does
not fit Perry, who has southern-European looks and has a normal to skinny posture (no-
match-description).
Each of these counts against the scenario that Perry is the robbing killer, except per-
haps his denial, which is neutral. Following the outcome of the court proceedings (cf.
Section 2.1 and Fig. 2), we model these findings as together excluding the Perry scenario,
in the sense that it is no longer a sufficiently reasonable possibility. In Fig. 4, this is indi-
cated by the box for the Perry scenario becoming gradually smaller, until it is reduced to
a line on the row labeled no-match-description. Since Perry’s denial is neutral
evidence for this scenario, the box has equal size on the third and fourth row (labeled
no-long-stay and denial).
At this stage (modeled by the line no-match-perry in Fig. 4), we still have the
possibility that someone else than Perry is the killing robber. This possibility becomes
more concrete when the DNA of an unknown third person is found on a bullet cartridge
(dna-unknown-third), suggesting that this third person can be the killer (third).
The court considers this finding to not make this possibility more or less believable, as
indicated in the figure by a box that has not changed size. Similarly, the rustling sounds
in the bushes (sound-in-bushes) are modeled as not affecting this possibility. Fur-
ther investigation does not establish a concrete connection (no-connection), exclud-
ing this possibility. This is shown in Fig. 4 by the second line in the bottom row.
Fig. 4. Alternative scenario: A robbery.
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Formally, we start from the case model that we constructed at the end of the previous
subsection on the initial findings (Fig. 3), consisting of three cases, one modeling the
guilty-as-charged scenario, one the robbery scenario, and one the possibility that some-
thing else happened. When the pit is found, the case robbery scenario is split into two
possibilities. One represents the scenario that Perry Sultan is the killing robber, and the
other that an unknown third person is. They are logical specializations of the second case
modeling the robbery:
2.1 victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ perry
2.2 victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ ¬perry
The long conjunction expressing the cumulative evidence considered (established at
the end of the previous subsection) is extended with the finding of the pit:
. . . ∧pit-found.
The case model corresponding to the second row in Fig. 4 consists of scenarios 1, 2.1,
2.2, and 3, each conjoined with the conjunction of all the evidence. As ordering of the
cases, we set:
Case 1 > Case 2.1 ~ Case 2.2 > Case 3
This ordering corresponds to the sizes of the boxes in the figure.
The finding that the found pit is not suitable for a long stay (no-long-stay) lowers
the plausibility of the scenario about Perry. Formally, the case modeling the scenario is
split into two parts, one part in which no-long-stay holds, the other ¬no-long-
stay. In the figure, the first part is visible on the third row as a somewhat smaller box
than on the second row.
2.1.1 victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ perry
. . . ∧ pit-found
∧ no-long-stay
2.1.2 victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ ¬perry
. . . ∧ pit-found
∧ ¬no-long-stay
Note that Case 2.1.2 is modeled as excluded, but is excluded by the evidence, repre-
senting that the believability of the perry-scenario is reduced. For the ordering, we fol-
low the sizes of the boxes in the figure:
Case 1 > Case 2.2 > Case 2.1.1 > Case 3 > Case 2.1.2
Perry’s denial of being involved extends the cases in the case model with an extra con-
junct (. . . ∧ denial), but does not change the ordering, as it is neutral with respect to
the believability of the Perry scenario.
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Like the no-long-stay evidence, no-fit-pipe and phone-not-linked
lead to a split of the Perry case in a part where the new evidence holds, and where it
does not hold. Finally, no-match-description excludes the Perry case. For this
evidence, there is no split and ¬no-match-description is taken to hold.
When the DNA of a third unknown person is found (dna-unknown-third), the
¬perry scenario is specified to include third. This evidence, and also sound-
in-bushes, does not affect the believability of the Perry scenario. Finally, no-
connection excludes this scenario, formalized by setting that ¬no-connection
holds at this stage.
3.3. The statement of the suspect
At this stage, two possibilities are still open. The first is the guilty-as-charged scenario
in which suspect Ed is guilty of killing Jenny. The other is the possibility that something
else has happened.
Following the outcome of the court proceedings, several considerations together
exclude the possibility that something else has happened. The development is graphically
shown in Fig. 5, modeling the phase in which the suspect’s statement is analyzed.
Several findings remain unexplained by what the suspect has stated—although they
could be—which reduces the plausibility of the third alternative that something else has
happened. There was a 40-minute delay before he called his daughter-in-law and the
emergency services (delayed-emergency-call). There is gun-shot residue on the
suspect’s hands and clothes and on the victim’s skull and hands (gunshot-residue).
Three cigarette butts are found next to the victim’s body, and they contain traces with a
DNA profile matching the suspect (cigarette-butts).
Fig. 5. The suspect’s statement.
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Several claims by the suspect are unbelievable or unacceptable considering the other
evidence. The suspect says he and the victim were walking (says-walking), while
witnesses saw them in the car (seen-in-car). The suspect says he saw nothing special
about the victim (saw-nothing-special), but she had extensive wounds and there
was much blood (wounds-and-blood). The suspect says that they were robbed
(says-robbed), while the valuables of suspect and victim were not stolen (valu-
ables-not-stolen).
Given all the evidence, the unexplained findings and the unbelievable or unacceptable
claims by the victim, he remains silent (remains-silent).
As shown by its decision, the court takes each of these considerations as making it rel-
atively less believable that something else has happened than that the suspect is guilty,
and when all taken together, as making the suspect’s guilt legally and convincingly pro-
ven, excluding the possibility that something else has happened. In Fig. 5, this is shown
by the boxes on the right gradually becoming smaller, until on the final row at the bot-
tom, it has become a line, indicating that the possibility that something else has happened
is excluded.
Formally, the construction is as before in Section 3.22.2.3. The third hypothesis that
the suspect is not guilty and there is no robbery, but something else has happened, is
at each step split into two, one in which the new evidence holds and one in which it
doesn’t. For instance, the rightmost box at the top row corresponds to this hypothesis:
3. victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery ∧ . . .
Here the dots correspond to the conjunction of all the evidential findings taken into
account up to this point. If we now consider delayed-emergency-call (second
row in Fig. 5), the possibility is split into two:
victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery ∧ . . . ∧ delayed-emergency-call
victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery ∧ . . . ∧ ¬delayed-emergency-call
The box in the figure corresponds to the first of these; the second is excluded by the
evidence delayed-emergency-call.
3.4. The suspect’s wounds and his physical capabilities
Two aspects of the case are discussed by the Appellate Court after the analysis of the
alternative scenario and statement of the suspect: the suspect’s wounds and the physical
capabilities of the suspect. Since at that stage, the robbery scenario and the hypothesis
that something else has happened have already been excluded in the model, the logical
role of these considerations cannot be properly shown using the case model arrived at at
the end of the previous section. Instead, it is more insightful to take a step back, going to
the stage where there still are three possibilities: guilt of the suspect, an unexpected
robbery, or something else.
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First, the court notes that the suspect’s and victim’s wounds are not in proportion
(disproportionate-wounds). The victim has extreme injuries, whereas the suspect
has a small wound on his forehead and on the back of his thumb. This fits the guilty sus-
pect scenario, but it goes against the hypothesis of an unexpected robbery, in which the
robber attacks both the suspect and the victim. In Fig. 6, this is shown by a change in the
size of the box denoting the robbery hypothesis.
Second, the defence has argued that the suspect is not physically capable to apply this
kind of force on the victim, given his heart problems and emphysema (health-is-
sues). This goes against the guilty suspect scenario, as reflected in Fig. 7 by the smaller
box on the second row. This point by the defence is countered by a statement by the sus-
pect’s son that the suspect’s capabilities are good when he has taken his medication
(son). Also, an expert reports that, despite his health issues, the suspect was physically
sufficiently capable to apply the kind of force assumed in the guilty suspect scenario. In
Fig. 7, this is reflected by reducing the size of the box for the robbery hypothesis relative
to that for the guilty-as-charged scenario to the same level as before considering the
health issues. In the figure, they are shown with equal size boxes on the third row, just as
on the first row.
4. The full case model, with connections to arguments, scenarios, and probabilities
Based on its analysis of the evidence and the hypotheses, the Appellate Court decides
that the crime is proven because of the facts and circumstances that follow from the evi-
dence and because of the lack of a reasonable explanation for several circumstances. The
court also considers that it has not become reasonable that someone else committed the
crime; hence, it concludes that it has been proven lawfully and convincingly that the sus-
pect committed manslaughter. The full analysis is shown in Fig. 8.
The resulting full case model’s structure is shown at the bottom of Fig. 8, and graphi-
cally it is arrived at by positioning all rows in the analysis above over one another.
Fig. 6. The suspect’s wounds.
Fig. 7. The physical capabilities of the suspect.
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The four core hypotheses (specifications of the four options discussed in Section 22)
are as follows. The phrases in capitals are used as abbreviating place-holders below.
1. GUILT: victim-killed ∧ guilt ∧ hit-by-gun ∧ hit-by-suspect ∧
motive
(continued)
Fig. 8. Analysis of the Appellate Court’s reasoning; with the structure of the resulting case model at the bottom.
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2. PERRY: victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ perry
3. THIRD: victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ robbery ∧ ¬perry ∧ third
4. OTHER: victim-killed ∧ ¬guilt ∧ ¬robbery
The totality of the evidence is collected in a long conjunction, as follows.
EVIDENCE:
suspect-with-spatters ∧ suspect-with-wound ∧ suspect-shaking
∧ remains-victim
∧ victim-bloody-face ∧ pool-of-blood ∧ neck-injury
∧ cartridges ∧ gunshot-residue-victim ∧ v-shaped-wounds
∧ gunshot-residue-suspect ∧ past-threats ∧ past-violence
∧ separation ∧ dating-other-men
∧ statement-suspect
∧ pit-found ∧ no-long-stay ∧ denial ∧ no-match-perry ∧ no-fit-
pipe
∧ phone-not-linked ∧ no-match-description
∧ dna-unknown-third ∧ sound-in-bushes ∧ no-connection
∧ delayed-emergency-call ∧ gunshot-residue ∧ cigarette-butts
∧ says-walking ∧ seen-in-car
∧ saw-nothing-special ∧ wounds-and-blood
∧ says-robbed ∧ valuables-not-stolen
∧ remains-silent
In the following, initial parts of the EVIDENCE conjunction are denoted EVIDENCE
(<sentence>), where the conjunction ends at <sentence>. For instance, EVI-
DENCE(remains-victim) equals suspect-with-spatters ∧ suspect-
with-wound ∧ suspect-shaking ∧ remains-victim.
Then the cases of the case models are as follows.
Case 1: GUILT ∧ EVIDENCE
Case 2.1: PERRY ∧ EVIDENCE(pit-found) ∧ ¬no-long-stay
Case 2.2: PERRY ∧ EVIDENCE(denial) ∧ ¬no-match-perry
Case 2.3: PERRY ∧ EVIDENCE(no-match-perry) ∧ ¬no-fit-pipe
Case 2.4: PERRY ∧ EVIDENCE(no-fit-pipe) ∧ ¬phone-not-linked
Case 2.5: PERRY ∧ EVIDENCE(phone-not-linked) ∧ ¬no-match-
description
Case 3: THIRD ∧ EVIDENCE(sound-in-bushes) ∧ ¬no-connection
Case 4.1: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(no-connection) ∧ ¬delayed-emergency-
call
Case 4.2: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(delayed-emergency-call) ∧ ¬gunshot-
residue
(continued)
B. Verheij / Topics in Cognitive Science (2019) 17
Case 4.3: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(gunshot-residue) ∧ ¬cigarette-butts
Case 4.4: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(cigarette-butts) ∧ ¬(says-walking ∧
seen-in-car)
Case 4.5: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(says-walking ∧ seen-in-car) ∧ ¬(saw-
nothing-special ∧ wounds-and-blood)
Case 4.6: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(saw-nothing-special ∧ wounds-and-
blood) ∧ ¬(says-robbed ∧ valuables-not-stolen)
Case 4.7: OTHER ∧ EVIDENCE(says-robbed ∧ valuables-not-stolen) ∧
¬remains-silent
The ordering relation on these fourteen cases is as follows. The ordering is chosen as
fitting the sizes of the boxes in the case model at the bottom of Fig. 8.
Case 1 > Case 3 > Case 2.1  ⋯  Case 2.5 > Case 4.1  ⋯  Case 4.7
As in Section 2.22.2, the case model can be connected to arguments, scenarios, and
probabilities.
4.1. Arguments
Arguments from premises to conclusions can be evaluated in the case model. For
instance, the argument from premise remains-victim to conclusion victim-
killed is coherent (by Case 1), presumptively valid (since Case 1 is maximal in the order-
ing), and conclusive (since all cases imply victim-killed). The argument from
pit-found to perry is coherent (for instance by Case 2.1) and not presumptively valid
(since Case 1 implies pit-found but is higher in the ordering than cases that imply
perry, such as Case 2.1). The argument is also not conclusive since there are cases imply-
ing the premise that do not imply the conclusion (such as Case 1 and Case 3).
The case model shows defeating circumstances for arguments. For instance, the coher-
ent argument from pit-found to perry is no longer coherent when the premises
no-long-stay, . . ., no-match-description are added since there is no case
that implies both the extended argument’s premises pit-found ∧ no-long-stay
∧ . . . ∧ no-match-description and its conclusion perry.
The case model focuses on the court’s reasoning and does not represent all argumenta-
tive aspects of the case. For instance, in the case model, the argument from motive to
guilt—which seems reasonable—has no special role. It is coherent, but that is a very
weak measure of validity.
4.2. Scenarios
In the analysis of the case, gradually ever more specific scenarios about what has hap-
pened are constructed. In the full case model, in particular the guilty-as-charged scenario
has been further specified: The victim was killed (victim-killed), hit by a gun
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(hit-by-gun), and hit by the suspect (hit-by-suspect), who had a motive for
killing the victim (motive). The other scenarios remain less specific in the analysis. In
the Perry robbery scenario, the victim is killed (victim-killed), in a robbery (rob-
bery), by Perry (perry).
The least specific scenario hardly deserves that name: It is the “scenario” that some-
thing else than what is considered has happened. In that scenario, the victim is killed
(victim-killed), but not according to the guilty-as-charged scenario (¬guilt) and
not in a robbery (¬robbery).
In the case model, the guilty-as-charged scenario follows conclusively from the evi-
dence and hence is beyond a reasonable doubt given all the evidence. The other three
considered scenarios are coherent, but they are not coherent given all the evidence.
The case model has a focus on the global coherence of scenarios, in the sense that
cases model whether the conjunction of the events in a scenario is considered possible.
The local coherence of scenarios, for instance, internal causal connections (motive is a
causal factor leading to victim-killed) or the time ordering (hit-by-gun pre-
cedes victim-killed) is not considered.
4.3. Probabilities
As in Section 2.22.2, the case model’s ordering can be realized probabilistically. For
instance, we can as before use the relative sizes of the boxes in the diagram at the bottom
of Fig. 8 (though many other numeric realizations are possible). This leads to the follow-
ing (approximate) probabilities for the 14 cases: Case 1, Case 3, Case 2.1, . . ., Case 2.5,
Case 4.1, . . ., Case 4.7, respectively: 50%, 20%, 4%, . . ., 4%, 1.4%, . . ., 1.4%. Coherent
arguments correspond to positive (conditional) probability (representing argument
strength) and conclusive probability to 100% strength. Possibilities are excluded when
they have a probability of 0%. For instance, before the evidence the guilty-as-charged
scenario has 50/(50 + 20 + 4 + ⋯ + 4 + 1.4 + ⋯ + 1.4) = 50% probability. The argu-
ment from empty premises to perry has strength (4 + ⋯ + 4)/100 = 20%. Given all
the evidence, the guilty-as-charged scenario has 100% probability, and the other possibili-
ties 0%.
The case model focuses on the ordering of probabilities, and on the extreme values
of 0% and 100%. Specific numeric effects are not modeled. For instance, here the
Perry-robbery scenario is modeled as being equivalent in the ordering to the third-per-
son-robbery scenario. In the numeric interpretation, when the Perry robbery scenario is
excluded, the (relative) probability of the third-person-robbery scenario increases. Using
the numbers above, we have that guilt: perry: third: “something else” changes
from 50: 20: 20: 10 to 50: 0: 20: 10, so the third-person-robbery scenario grows from
20/100 = 20% probable to 20/80 = 25% probable. The something-else scenario changes
from 10% to 12.5%. If one assumes that the third-person scenario should not or negli-
gibly be affected by the exclusion of the Perry scenario, different modeling choices
should be made.
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5. Discussion of the analysis using the four guiding questions
We discuss the analysis of the Simonshaven case using four guiding questions that
were suggested by the special issue editors.
a. Objectivity and subjectivity. To what extent is the analysis objective and to what
extent is it based on subjective beliefs, assumptions, and choices
The outcome of the analysis can be considered as a model of the Appellate Court’s rea-
soning, as they appear in the source material available. The intention has been to stay
as close as possible to the sources, without adding new elements. Choices have been
made in the selection of which elements of the discussions are modeled, and how they
are structured. The case model approach does not require the specification of specific
probabilities, hence limiting the assumptions that to be made in addition to what is
available in the source material. Assumptions are made concerning the ordering of the
cases in the case model. Their specific sizes in the graphical representations may sug-
gest more specific assumptions than are modeled in the orderings, but they do not
affect the analysis of how the Appellate Court arrives at its final decision. For evalua-
tive parts of the analysis (including the choice of the ordering), we have focused on the
summaries and decisions in the Appellate Court’s reasoning, in particular also for the
final decision about whether guilt has been proven legally and convincingly. In this
way, we address the issue that in hard cases it can be subject to debate “what counts as
enough” for establishing guilt, and leave it to the court that has the authority to decide
the debate. As the model aims to follow the court’s decision, the debate can then con-
tinue about whether that model is as it should be.
b. Cognitive and legal naturalness. How natural is the analysis from a cognitive and
legal point of view
The analysis of the Appellate Court’s reasoning (as summarized in Fig. 8) is natural
in the sense that it can be read as a model of the investigation of the case, in which
gradually hypotheses are developed and evaluated, guided by a sequence of evi-
dence taken into account. Arguments and scenarios associated with the analysis are
close to their counterparts in human reasoning and legal practice. Whereas probabil-
ities are sometimes considered to be less natural from a human reasoning and legal
practice perspective, in particular since people often make errors and it can be hard
to assign all relevant numbers, here probabilities play a role in the background. Still
the method adheres to the probability calculus, in the sense that case models have a
probabilistic interpretation, hence preventing probabilistic reasoning errors. Errors
can of course still be made, but then the errors are part of the model, and can be
corrected by adapting the model. Also as said there was no need in our analysis to
assign specific numbers, instead focusing on whether a probability is positive or
equal to one, how the probabilities are ordered, and how these develop under condi-
tionalization by additional evidence. In this way, there is more emphasis on the
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qualitative aspects of probabilities while staying within the bounds of Bayesian
rationality.
By this mix of argumentative, scenario, and probabilistic methods of analysis, an
attempt has been made to balance the strengths of each.
c. Errors and biases. Did your analysis identify errors or biases in the reasoning of
the judge, prosecutor, or defence
The analysis aims to identify the assumptions that are needed for arriving at a decision.
These assumptions are encoded in the case model that is the result of the analysis. The
focus has been on the reasoning of the Appellate Court. The analysis suggests that the
court has arrived at a balanced decision, using the material brought forward by prosecu-
tor or defence. In one detail, namely the role of Perry’s denial that he is the robber, our
analysis models this evidence as neutral with respect to the robbery scenario, where the
court seems to consider it as evidence, making the robbery scenario more strongly sup-
ported. This choice plays no role in the overall outcome of the decision.
d. Legal constraints. Does your analysis respect the legal constraints, such as the bur-
den and standard of proof and the right to remain silent
Our approach aims to provide a rational analysis of the evidence, the hypotheses,
and their evaluation. Legal constraints are not an explicit part of the approach. Still
specific themes connected to legal constraints can be addressed. We discuss specific
legally relevant themes: the presumption of innocence, the standard of proof, the
burden of proof, and the right to remain silent. The presumption of innocence is
addressed in our approach as initially the not-guilty-as-charged scenario is consid-
ered a coherent possibility, to be excluded on the basis of specific evidence. As
standard of proof, we consider a position to be legally and convincingly proven
when it follows conclusively (using qualitative terminology) or, equivalently, when
it follows with probability 1 (using quantitative terminology). As explained in Ver-
heij (2014), this allows for a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doubt:
Doubt about a position is reasonable when there is an alternative position that is
considered possible; doubt is unreasonable when there is no such position. All
remaining doubt—inevitably always there—is transferred to doubt about the model,
for instance, about whether all possibilities have been taken into account. This is a
modeling choice. It is also possible to always model an alternative hypothesis of
minimal plausibility (minimal in the ordering) that represents remaining doubt. With
respect to the burden of proof, our method of analysis allows for the inclusion of all
discussion elements brought forward. By including the not-guilty-as-charged possi-
bility from the start, the prosecution has the burden to exclude that possibility by
additional evidence, while the defence does not have to provide a complete alterna-
tive scenario. With respect to the right to remain silent, our approach is neutral.
What is not said is not in the model. In this case, the Appellate Court’s reasoning
included the silence of the suspect as counting against him. In our analysis, the sus-
pect’s silence has therefore been explicitly modeled (remains-silent).
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6. Conclusion
In sum, we have provided an analysis of the Simonshaven case, using a method “with
and without probabilities”: It is with probabilities, in the sense that the analysis adheres
to the probability calculus and can be given a numeric probabilistic interpretation. It is
without probabilities, in the sense that the analysis does not require the specification of
many numbers. Characteristics of the approach are as follows:
1. A combination of theory construction and evidential update. The end result of the
analysis is a case model that is gradually constructed, in a process similar to an
investigation. Hypotheses are developed and evaluated under the influence of a
sequence of evidence.
2. A combination of qualitative and quantitative modeling. Case models consist of for-
mal cases and a preference ordering; hence, they are qualitative in nature, but can
be given a quantitative interpretation, adhering to the probability calculus.
3. A combination of arguments, scenarios, and probabilities. Arguments and scenarios
can be evaluated in the case model. Arguments can be coherent, presumptively
valid and conclusive. Arguments can have defeating circumstances. Scenarios can
be coherent, plausible, and beyond a reasonable doubt. These notions can be given
a probabilistic interpretation.
Compared to existing argumentative, scenario, and probabilistic approaches, the approach
has several limitations. Argumentative approaches extensively study argument structure and
its connection to argument evaluation, where the present approach is based on notions of for-
mal validity of elementary arguments and defeating circumstances. In scenario approaches,
the role of causal and evidential generalizations is studied as tools for assessing scenario
anchoring and quality, a topic remaining unaddressed in the present approach. Probabilistic
approaches have a precise numerical theory of the interaction between several pieces of evi-
dence and hypothetical events, while the present approach focuses on the ordering of cases
only. Also, in argumentative, scenario, and probabilistic approaches, significant attention is
paid to knowledge representation aspects, concretely by the study of argumentation schemes,
scenario schemes, and BN idioms. Such tools for knowledge representation have here not
been addressed.
Following the initial proposal of the case model approach “with and without probabili-
ties” and its applications to evidential reasoning (Verheij, 2014, 2017), this study is the
first in which it has been applied to a real-world case in full complexity.
In some respects, the results seem promising. For instance, the full analysis of the case
(as graphically represented in Fig. 8) models significant parts of the court’s reasoning,
while staying reasonably close to what is actually said in the decision text. No specific
numeric probabilistic estimates are needed for showing how the reasoning develops,
while considerations of relative plausibility are modeled. Alternative hypotheses, among
them the scenarios considered by the court, are explicitly available and modeled in their
connection to the evidence. The case model construction shows which evidence supports
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or excludes which hypotheses. In these ways, elements of probabilistic, scenario, and
argumentative analyses appear side by side (see Di Bello & Verheij, 2018 for an exposi-
tion of the related, yet different roles played by probabilities, scenarios and arguments in
evidential reasoning). Hence the two issues discussed about Bayesian network modeling
(Section 11) are addressed: the issue of incompleteness of numeric information since case
models require no specific numeric estimates; and the issue of transparent interpretation
since case models are formally connected to probabilistic, argumentative, and scenario
notions.
In other respects, questions remain. For instance, could a fine-grained probabilistic,
argumentative, or scenario model be translated into a case model? Which elements can
be kept, and which are lost? Where does the ordering of the cases come from? Are there
systematic ways of developing such an ordering, perhaps based on the court’s decision
text directly, or by using translations from other kinds of analysis? Aren’t there hidden
assumptions that hinder modeling or imply reasoning errors?
Further research may help answer such questions, and comparing the results of the dif-
ferent analyses in this special issue would be a valuable tool for making progress.
Thereby, we would gradually develop our understanding of how probabilistic, argumenta-
tive, and scenario analytic methods are connected and can strengthen one another.
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Notes
1. See Verheij et al. (2016) and http://www.ai.rug.nl/verheij/nwofs/.
2. Here, we have added this only to the guilty-as-charged hypothesis. It could also be
added to the not-guilty hypothesis, if considered relevant.
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